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Abstract
This study examines the effects of oligarch ownership on corporate capital struc-
tures. Using panel data from Ukraine, I find that oligarch–owned companies employ
significantly more debt and liabilities than their peers. However, there is no direct
relation between oligarch ownership and target capital structure. Whereas the de-
terminants of target leverage are similar across all owners, differences in firm char-
acteristics also have a fairly small effect. I show that larger leverage is due to better
access to debt, which results in lower rebalancing costs and faster restructurings of
oligarch–owned companies. The findings clearly suggest that oligarchs benefit from
the accumulated advantages.
JEL: G32, P31
Keywords: Capital Structure, Leverage, Oligarchs, Influential Ownership, Con-
nected Firms, Cumulative Advantage
Note: this is authors’ version of the manuscript accepted for publication in Eco-
nomic Change and Restructuring. See final version at http://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-
018-9226-9
1 Introduction
Capital structure and corporate control are among many unresolved issues facing mod-
ern economics. Both fields yielded an enormous body of literature, which, however, often
relies on the evidence from developed and especially Anglo-Saxon markets. This work ex-
amines capital structure in the post-Soviet market (Ukraine), which might be interesting
in terms of international discussion.
First, Ukrainian market is dominated by influential owners, known as oligarchs1. Sec-
ondly, the Ukrainian economy has the main features of emerging markets, such as poor
protection of property rights, concentrated ownership, and weak separation between man-
agement and ownership. Such features provide a favorable environment for influential
owners.
Thirdly, in contrast to more general cases of political ties or group affiliation, oligarch
ownership could be treated as exogenous. It was typically set in early-mid 1990s during
the period of privatization. For instance, in my sample median oligarch–owned enterprise
was privatized in 1995, preserving its ownership in later periods. Although firm selection
∗State Hydrographic Service of Ukraine. E-mail address: demid.chernenko@gmail.com
1The term “oligarch” denotes a post-Soviet industrial and/or financial magnate (usually Russian or
Ukrainian) who “controls sufficient resources to influence national politics” (Guriev and Rachinsky 2005).
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during the privatization was not random, subsequent differences cannot be separated
from oligarch ownership itself. Hence, two decades after privatization one may argue
that oligarch ownership is predetermined by the 1990s reforms, but there is no clear
reversed relationship with present-day leverage.
Using comprehensive dataset of Ukrainian public companies from 2002 to 2016, I study
the effects of oligarch ownership on corporate capital structures. I identify 35 oligarchic
groups, 26 of which are covered by my dataset. As a preview, oligarch–owned companies
tend to use significantly more debt and liabilities than their peers. However, there is no
direct relation between oligarch ownership and target capital structure. The determinants
of target leverage are similar across all owners, and differences in firm characteristics
(specifically, firm size) also have a fairly small effect. Further analysis reveals that the
differences are due to better access to debt, which results in lower re-balancing costs and
faster restructurings of oligarch–owned companies. Hence, the evidence clearly indicates
that influential owners gain from the accumulated advantages.
The results add to several strands in the studies. First, this study follows along a grow-
ing literature on capital structure of emerging markets. Previous evidence (e.g., Booth
et al. 2001) suggests that capital structure decisions in developing markets are driven by
the same variables as in developed ones, although there are persistent institution-specific
differences. However, available information on capital structure of transition markets
(and, more specifically, Ukraine) remains partial and incomplete. In particular, available
works verify the context of Central Europe (Nivorozhkin 2004, 2005; De Haas and Peeters
2006; Jõeveer 2013) and Russia (Ivashkovskaya and Solntseva 2007; Pöyry and Maury
2010). In sharp contrast, only one published study explores Ukrainian firms (Stephan
et al. 2011).
Next, this study also adds to the research of ownership effects, and more specifically
effects of influential ownership (see a review in the next section). Finally, the results ver-
ify the suggestion that oligarchs boost performance due to better access to debt (Guriev
and Rachinsky 2005; Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko 2008). However, the implications
are not strictly positive, as Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko (2008) suggest. Recent evi-
dence emphasizes the role of firm-level persistence in macro-level path dependence (e.g.,
Gokhberg and Roud 2016). In similar fashion, the relative effectiveness of oligarch–owned
firms may be caused by intentional distortions in access to credit. This implies that bet-
ter performance of these firms could be the cause of macro-level path dependence in the
long-term. Therefore, any efforts to suppress insider lending should be welcomed.
The remainder of the paper organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing
literature with a focus on the effects of influential ownership. Section 3 provides data
sources, measurement of variables, and oligarch definition. Section 4 offers empirical
model, results, and robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Capital Structure and Influential Ownership
Capital structure studies, started by the Miller–Modigliani theorem, developed into an
enormous body of literature, both theoretical and empirical2. In particular, ownership
effects usually refer to the agency theory and principal-–agent problem. In the agency
2Two main focuses of capital structure studies include the determinants of capital structure choice
(e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995; Jõeveer 2013) and testing of the particular theories, such as static trade-
off, dynamic trade-off, pecking order, agency theory, or market timing model.
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theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) tax advantages of debt are weighted against agency
costs (sum of residual loss and monitoring and bonding expenditures). Jensen (1986) also
argues that higher leverage has a disciplining effect due to obligatory debt repayments.
Indeed, these arguments have merit in developed markets. However, in emerging markets
ownership concentration is typically very high, while the separation between management
and ownership is weak or even absent. Since an owner involved in every-day corporate
operations, agency theory cannot be applied. Furthermore, oligarch–owned firms benefit
from their accumulated advantages, or “Matthew effect”3.
First, oligarchs benefit from their group affiliations, which could improve the mem-
ber’s efficiency. Chang and Hong (2000) and Manos et al. (2007) suggest that large
business groups have higher ability to borrow from internal sources. In addition, group
affiliation may affect incentives, as in the model of “productive oligarchs” proposed by
Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko (2008). Resembling the Olson’s “stationary bandit” argu-
ment, this model predicts that oligarchs are more likely invest in productivity-enhancing
projects and thus might employ more debt.
Secondly, influential owners benefit from the existence of affiliated banks in their
groups. This affiliation facilitates new borrowings due to reduced information asym-
metries. Moreover, affiliated banks might lend on preferential conditions (for example,
require less collateral), or even beyond the creditworthiness.
In contrast, non-oligarch firms face a very limited financing choice due to a significant
share of the oligarch–owned banks. Borrowing in these banks might be undesired due
to mandatory disclosure of the business processes and value of assets or even impossible
when your business is a competitor of the oligarch’s. Hence, the existence of affiliated
banks might reduce debt financing of non-oligarch firms. The largest Ukrainian bank
“PrivatBank” (21% of total banking assets in 2016) appears to be anecdotal evidence on
this issue. PrivatBank was oligarch-owned, and market participants thought that inside
credits constituted about 90% of its loan portfolio. Unsurprisingly, after nationalization
on December 18, 2016, Central Bank stated that insiders make up about 97% of the
bank’s corporate loans4.
Thirdly, oligarch firms have also the advantage of political connections. Fisman
(2001) and Faccio (2006) argue that political connections explain a large share of firms’
value. Dinç (2005) also demonstrates that political connections facilitate lending from
government-owned banks. Similarly, Faccio (2006) suggests that political connections
make cheap credit available in state banks. Not surprisingly, a significant strand of stud-
ies reports a positive and significant link between political connections and firms’ lending
(Khwaja and Mian 2005; Charumilind et al. 2006; Fraser et al. 2006; Ebrahim et al. 2014;
Saeed et al. 2015). In addition, Faccio et al. (2006) suggest that politically-connected
firms are more likely to be bailed out from default than their non-connected peers. Thus,
connected firms have an incentive to use more debt and over-invest.
Even more, there seems to be an interrelation between political connections and ex-
istence of affiliated banks. Specifically, Baum et al. (2008) find that politically affiliated
Ukrainian banks have significantly lower interest rate margins and thus higher capital-
ization. Hence, oligarchs may benefit more from their captive banks due to the presence
of political connections.
3“For whoever has will be given more, and they will have an abundance. Whoever does not have, even
what they have will be taken from them” — The Bible (New International Version), Matthew 25:29.
4See KyivPost, “Government nationalizes PrivatBank, guarantees deposits” (Dec. 18, 2016) and BBC,
“Ukraine’s biggest lender PrivatBank nationalised” (Dec. 19, 2016).
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Finally, influential owners have the advantage of property protection, and thus no
problem of corporate control. Oligarchs can avoid a hostile takeover using their power
and connections, whereas others cannot protect themselves in such a case. Therefore,
influential owners supposed to be less selective in the usage of any external financing.
This also implies irrelevance of voting share to capital structure decision.
In sum, oligarch–owned firms have both the ability and incentives to borrow more,
whereas situation for non-oligarch firms is the opposite. Thus, primary hypothesis of this
study is a positive relation between oligarch ownership and leverage.
3 Sample overview
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
The data come from the publicly available SMIDA database, provided by the government
agency responsible for disclosure policy5. SMIDA includes several sub-bases:
• Issuers: financial statements of 20 thousand Ukrainian firms, about half of which
are public companies;
• Professional participants: information about stock exchanges, brokerages, dealers,
asset management companies, auditors, depositaries;
• Violation information: violations on the securities market;
• Owners of 10%: information about blockholders (share 5% or more in 2002–2006,
10% and more since 2007);
• Issues: securities issues and registration;
• Printed publications: archives of the stock market newspapers, issued by the Na-
tional Commission on Securities and Stock Market.
Following standard practice, I limit my sample to non-financial companies (due to dif-
ferent nature of financial firms’ capital structure and high regulation). However, utilities
and transport companies are not excluded due to weak government regulation. Suffi-
cient information (such as ownership structures and financials verified by an auditor) is
available only for public companies; thus, I also limit my sample to public companies
(officially, open joint stock companies before 2011 and public joint stock companies since
2012).
Finally, most of the firms in the database seem to be inactive or shell companies.
Typically, these firms remain registered due to red tape associated with dissolution or
bankruptcy procedures. Thus, I restrict my sample to active firms (non-zero sales) with
full information available for at least one year. Observations with incomplete informa-
tion are not taken into account. However, where possible, I replace omitted or unreadable
financial statements by ones from the firms’ sites. In addition, several available obser-
vations were excluded from the sample. In particular, observations with negative equity
(typically insolvent companies in bankruptcy proceedings) and observations affected by
the war in Donbass (companies located in the uncontrolled and/or war zone territories)
5Stock Market Infrastructure Development Agency of Ukraine database, http://smida.gov.ua
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were excluded. Almost all Donbass-located firms also fall into one of the previous criteria
(zero sales, incomplete information or negative equity).
The initial SMIDA database is a strongly unbalanced panel with a large number of
omissions. I select 250 firms to get a more manageable number of results. Since detailed
structural information is not available, I rely on simple random sampling procedure.
The final sample includes 2,340 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2016 (roughly 9.4
observations per firm; see industry and time structure in appendix A).
According to state statistical data, on average there were 7,852 public companies
in 2002–2016 (both financial and non-financial). Furthermore, as mentioned below, a
significant number of public companies seem to be inactive. Next, the number of all
public companies declines with time (from 12,137 in 2002 to 3,122 in 2016). This trend
accelerated in the early 2010s after tightening legal requirements for public companies.
This tightening resulted in massive changes of the legal form, especially noticeable in
2010–2012. The data seem to follow this downward with a lag of several years. However,
there is a gap in 2010, caused by lack of readable financials for this year in the SMIDA
database. In sum, although there is no structural information for public companies, my
sample can be considered as representative for the whole set.
3.2 Oligarch Ownership
Oligarch groups are the key component in this research. I aim to define “true oligarchs”,
rather than just rich individuals. In this regard, stable oligarch clans should be consid-
ered as one owner due to difficulties in separation of ownership across these groups. A
similar phenomenon can be found in either historical (for example, robber barons in the
nineteenth-century United States) or geographical (other developing markets) perspec-
tive. Moreover, in the context of group affiliation, Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol
are similar to post-communist oligarch business groups. Thus, I label business group an
“oligarch” if it satisfies the following conditions.
First, oligarchs are the largest private owners in the country (Guriev and Rachinsky
2005). Thus, at least one group member should belong to the largest private owners.
I limit my search to the participants of the “top 100 richest” rankings. These annual
rankings are provided by the business magazines Forbes (Ukraine), Korrespondent, and
Focus6.
Influential owners tend to hide their ownership through offshore firms and/or nominee
owners. Typical ownership structure includes 2–4 mediators between a public company
and ultimate oligarch owner. Figure 1 shows an example of such a structure (Druzhkovka
PJSC). Whenever possible, I tried to work with SMIDA information. For example,
SMIDA shows that 99.1% of Druzhkovka PJSC was controlled by Vesco Limited (old
name UMG United Minerals Group Limited). However, considering low transparency
(as in this case), I also use hand-gathered information from business magazines, daily pe-
riodicals, and information agencies (e.g., Korrespondent, Business, Vlast’ deneg, Zerkalo
Nedeli, Delovaya stolitsa, Delo, Ukrayinska Pravda). Going back to the example, nu-
merous mass-media sources help to trace the relation between Vesco LTD and Ahmetov.
In general, oligarch ownership is not strictly anonymous, and ultimate owners could be
detected in all cases.
6The first-ever ranking was published by Korrespondent in 2006. Focus launched its rating in 2007,
whereas Forbes (Ukraine) published its first ranking in 2011. Several available rankings include fewer or
greater than 100 persons.
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Secondly, oligarch ownership is based on the fusion of political power and property.
Thus, following Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko (2008), every oligarch group has at least
one representative in the parliament or government. Such a group possesses sufficient
political power to promote its own interests. As in the ownership details, I extract this
information from mass-media claims. Furthermore, fairly often oligarchs enter openly
into politics (e.g., Poroshenko is the fifth president of Ukraine, Tihipko was Vice Prime
Minister in 2010–2012, Khoroshkovskyi was First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine in 2012).
Thirdly, oligarchs control multiple businesses (at least 2), which intensively coordi-
nate their activities in day-to-day operations. This definition excludes single-business
owners and executive top managers. Furthermore, a day-to-day operations criterion ex-
cludes partnerships between different oligarch groups (e.g., System Capital Management
and Smart Holding or Ukrprominvest/Roshen and Energy Standard). Such partnerships
imply strategic coordination rather than effective day-to-day control.
Based on these criteria, I identify 35 oligarchic groups (Table 1), 26 of which are
covered by my dataset. Several firms in the sample are owned by two oligarch groups
(oligarch partnerships). Oligarch-owned firms constitute 25.4% of observations and 24.0%
of firms (for 6.4% of the firms an owner has changed during the period of research). The
oligarch’s share of public companies tends to increase with time (see appendix A).
Oligarch presence is especially noticeable in the mining, manufacture of machinery
and electrical equipment, food production, metallurgy, and utilities. In contrast, there is
no oligarch–owned firm in apparel production and a very small number in construction
materials and wood manufacturing.
3.3 Variables Definition
Table 2 provides definitions of the variables used in the study. Dependent variables are
different measures of leverage: debt-to-capital ratio (DTC ) and liabilities-to-assets ratio
(LTA). Debt-to-capital ratio (DTC ) is calculated as debt to the sum of debt and equity.
Following previous studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995) debt denotes only financial
(interest-bearing) debt. Liabilities-to-assets ratio (LTA) represents more broad definition
of leverage, which includes non-financial liabilities, such as deferred tax, accounts payable,
tax payable, accrued expenses, and provisions. LTA is calculated as total liabilities (assets
minus equity) to total assets. This study does not use more common financial-debt-to-
assets ratio. As Welch (2011) argues, this is incorrect measure, which counts non-financial
liabilities as the equivalent of equity.
All dependent variables are book ratios due to several reasons. First, the market
value of equity might be affected by the type of owner (Driffield et al. 2007; Maury
and Liljeblom 2009; Pöyry and Maury 2010). Secondly, Fama and French (2002) also
point out that market leverage is not completely under managers’ direct control, and
therefore book leverage is better as target ratio. Thirdly, book values refer to “assets in
place” which is better coverage of debt than growth opportunities (Myers 1977). Finally,
market data might be unreliable due to small trade volumes and the common practice of
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Table 1: Ukrainian oligarchic groups in 2002–2016
Group Owners (members) SampleFirms Obs.
System Capital Management Akhmetov 10 109
Smart Holding Novinsky, Klyamko 6 47
Energy Standard Grigorishin 5 60
Industrial Union of Donbas Taruta, Mkrtchian, Haiduk 5 40
Energo Nusenkis, Baisarov 4 56
Privat Kolomoyskyi, Boholyubov, Martynov 4 37
Group DF Firtash, Lyovochkin, Boyko 4 31
Universal Investment Group Antonov 3 35
Azovmash Yuriy & Arsen Ivanyushchenko 3 28
Kernel Verevsky 2 27
Motor Sich Boguslayev 2 22
Ukrprominvest/Roshen Poroshenko, Kosiuk, Vadaturskyy 2 18
Nord Landyk 2 17
Finance and Credit Zhevago, Kucherenko 2 10
Astarta Ivanchyk, Korotkov 1 14
Dynamo Hryhoriy & Ihor Surkis, Medvedchuk 1 13
Interpipe Pinchuk 1 13
TAS Tihipko 1 13
Konti/APK-Invest Kolesnikov 1 11
Obolon Slobodyan 1 9
Ukrinterproduct Leshchinsky 1 8
Stirol Yankovsky 1 8
Creativ Group Berezkin 1 8
Development Construction Holding Yaroslavsky 1 8
AVK Avramenko, Kravets 1 5
Concern AVEC Feldman 1 3
Aval Shpig − −
Ukrsotsbank Khoroshkovskyi − −
Pravex Chernovetskyi & his family − −
Forum Group Yurushev − −
Uvercon Prutnik − −
Continuum Eremeev, Lagur, Ivahiv − −
EpiCentre K Oleksandr & Halyna Hereha − −
Cascade Investment Khomutynnik − −
Neftegazobycha Shufrych, Rudkovsky − −
Note: this table provides the list of Ukrainian oligarch groups (see criteria in the text). Several firms in
the sample are owned by two oligarch groups. Haiduk formally left the Industrial Union of Donbas in
2010, but keeps strong ties with the group; Eremeev deceased in 2015.
market manipulation in Ukraine.
Independent variables include oligarch ownership dummy and firm-level factors. Oli-
garch is a dummy variable that equals 1 if oligarch is controlling owner and 0 otherwise.
This variable captures direct effects of oligarch ownership. Notice that the controlling
owner does not necessary hold a majority of a company’s stock; oligarchs are able to ef-
fectively control enterprises even with a small share in ownership. In such a case majority
of shares does not carry a vote, leaving control to an oligarch.
OwnOligarch is an additional control for the share of oligarch voting rights. This
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Table 2: Variables definition
Acronym Variable Construction
DTC Debt-to-capital ratio Debt / (Debt + Equity)
LTA Liabilities-to-assets ratio Liabilities / Assets
Oligarch Oligarch dummy 1 if controlling owner, and 0 otherwise
OwnOligarch Oligarch ownership share Share of oligarch voting rights
Size Firm size Log(Assets, in thousand 2002 year LCU)
Tang Assets tangibility Fixed assets (PPE) / Assets
Prof Profitability EBIT / Assets
Growth Growth opportunities ∆Sales / Sales0 (in 2002 year prices)
Age Firm age Number of years since firm establish-ment or reorganization
MedDTC Industry median DTC Med𝑖, 𝑖∈(𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦) = Med(Year, Industry, -i)MedLTA Industry median LTA
Note: this table provides definitions and construction of the variables used in the study. DTC and LTA
are dependent variables; the rest are explanatory variables. See further details in the text.
variable aims to capture effects of oligarch’s ownership concentration.
The next four variables (firm size, profitability, tangibility, growth) are classic deter-
minants proposed in Rajan and Zingales (1995). Size is measured by deflated firm assets,
as the natural logarithm of total assets in 2002-year thousand hryvnias (local currency
unit). Base-year prices were calculated according to the deflator from the state statis-
tical data. Size captures both bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry between
capital markets and firm managers. Hence, larger firms supposed to have higher lever-
age. However, politically connected firms could replace the significance of firm size with
connections (Saeed et al. 2015).
Profitability (Prof ) is a return on assets, measured as earnings before interest pay-
ments and taxes (EBIT) to assets. Profitability is positively related to leverage in static
trade-off theory and negatively related in the pecking order theory. Initial profitability
data is influenced by outliers. Thus, the data were winsorized at 1% and 99% levels to
account for extreme values.
Tangibility (Tang) is assets tangibility, measured as property, plant and equipment
(PPE) to assets. Tangibility is a measure of collateral a firm can offer to its creditors,
and thus oligarch–owned firms are expected to be less sensitive to firm tangibility.
Growth is a proxy for growth opportunities, measured as the relative change of sales
(in 2002-year prices). The growth variable was winsorized at 1% and 99% levels to
account for extreme values. In general, high growth opportunities are related to larger
information asymmetries and therefore lower indebtedness. However, connected high-
growth firms might rely less on debt financing due to preferential credit (Saeed et al.
2017).
Age is firm age, measured as a number of years since firm establishment (or reorganiza-
tion, if a firm was founded before 1991). Thus, Age equals 0 for newly created companies.
Age is an indirect measure of information asymmetry (younger firms face higher asym-
metries than well-known on the market). Hence, age supposed to be positively related to
leverage
Finally, MedDTC and MedLTA are industry medians (debt-to-capital ratio or liabilities-
to-assets ratio, respectively) for each year, which reflect omitted industry-related factors.
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However, some industries contain only 10–12 firms7. Thus, industry medians are calcu-
lated for every firm as industry-year median leverage with own firm excluded.
3.4 Differences across Owners
I start research by comparing differences across oligarch–owned and non-oligarch firms.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for oligarch–owned and non-oligarch companies,
as well as t-test for mean comparison. As expected, oligarch–owned firms tend to raise
more debt and liabilities. Furthermore, the differences are statistically significant for
all variables except industry median (narrow leverage DTC) and growth. In particular,
oligarch–owned firms are larger, older, more profitable, and hold less property, plant, and
equipment in their assets8. Whereas firm-level factors are clearly different, the effects on
capital structure remain unclear without further study.
Table 3: A comparison between oligarch and non-oligarch firms
Statistic Oligarch (obs. = 595) Non-oligarch (obs. = 1,745) t-testAverage St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
Debt-to-capital (DTC) 0.218 0.261 0.183 0.249 −2.797***
Liabilities-to-assets (LTA) 0.456 0.256 0.396 0.275 −4.846***
Industry median DTC 0.083 0.057 0.079 0.066 −1.351
Industry median LTA 0.349 0.160 0.292 0.123 −7.859***
OwnOligarch 0.775 0.214 0.005 0.040 87.269***
Size 11.940 1.978 9.453 2.183 −25.775***
Tang (PPE/Assets) 0.412 0.238 0.472 0.256 5.206***
Prof (EBIT/Assets) 0.055 0.140 0.015 0.292 −4.379***
Growth 0.129 0.979 0.072 0.889 −1.237
Age 12.812 4.716 12.428 4.914 −1.698*
Note: this table provides means and Welch two sample t-test for mean comparison (𝐻0: difference ̸= 0). (*), (**)
and (***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively. See appendix A for more detailed statistics.
4 Empirical Model and Results
4.1 Econometric Model
This study applies the dynamic model of capital structure, based on panel data. Since
capital structure choice is dynamic by nature (Flannery and Rangan 2006), such a model
seems to be more relevant from a purely theoretical viewpoint. In particular, static
framework implies immediate adjustments of capital structure and thus ignores differences
in the adjustment process. On the contrary, better access to debt affects re-leveraging
process, rather than targets the leverage itself. Strebulaev (2007) suggests that firms
refinance only occasionally due to adjustment costs. Furthermore, comparative statics at
refinancing points and cross-section dynamics of leverage differ dramatically (Strebulaev
2007). Thus I choose a dynamic framework, leaving traditional static model as a mere
7Industries are classified according to international standard industrial classification of all economic
activities (Rev.4). See industry composition of the dataset in appendix A.
8As mentioned earlier, firm selection during the privatization was not random. Nevertheless, it is not
clear to what extent differences between oligarch and non-oligarch firms come from non-random selection
of ownership.
9
robustness check. More precisely, this study employs dynamic partial adjustment model
(1), which may be re-written in the following form (2).
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛾(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒*𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) (1)
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (1− 𝛾)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒*𝑖𝑡 (2)
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is one of the dependent variables (DTC or LTA). 𝛾 is the parameter for
the speed of adjustment (𝛾 > 0). If 𝑡 → ∞ then 𝛾 = 1, and therefore 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 →
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒*𝑖𝑡. Since adjustment costs are present, any adjustments are not immediate, i.e.
𝛾 ∈ (0, 1). The higher these adjustment costs are, the lower parameter 𝛾 will be. In other
words, firms with lower financial constraints and financing costs are able to rebalance their
structures quickly. Rewriting (2) using 𝛼 = (1− 𝛾) yields the following equation (3).
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + (1− 𝛼)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒*𝑖𝑡 (3)
Unobservable target debt level is a function of available determinants in this period 𝑥′𝑖𝑡,
i.e. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒*𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡). Then, impact of target 𝑓(𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡) on the leverage is its estimated
coefficient divided by adjustment parameter. Assuming a linear relationship gives the
model (4).





Finally, the model should take into account panel data structure. Therefore, id-
iosyncratic error should be a sum of unobserved firm fixed effects 𝜇𝑖, time fixed effects
𝜈𝑡, and standard error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (homoskedastic and not serially correlated). Two-ways
fixed effects model excludes the possibility of omitted variable bias, caused by any firm-
invariant or time factors. Thus, equation (5) presents empirical model for 𝑖 ∈ {1, ..., 𝑛}
and 𝑡 ∈ {1, ..., 𝑇}.
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5)
Finally, in order to study direct effects I introduce oligarch ownership effects 𝜃𝑂𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ.
In such a model target debt level is a function of oligarch ownership effects 𝜃𝑂𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ and
firm level-controls 𝑋 ′𝑖𝑡 (6).
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑂𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6)
The model (6) includes both direct and indirect effects of oligarch ownership. Di-
rect effects imply immediate relation between oligarch ownership and target debt level
(i.e., oligarch effects 𝜃𝑂𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ are statistically significant). On the contrary, indirect re-
lation suggests mediation effects: (1) ownership-specific adjustment parameters 𝛼, (2)
differences in firm-level characteristics 𝑋 ′𝑖𝑡, or (3) ownership-specific coefficients 𝛽 (deter-
minants of capital structure).
Lagged response variables are correlated with the unobserved effects by definition,
making standard estimators inconsistent. Furthermore, studentized Koenker Breusch-
Pagan tests indicate heteroskedasticity. Thus, generalized method of moments (GMM)
is the most appropriate estimator. Furthermore, since sample includes a relatively large
number of observations, system (Blundell-Bond) GMM achieves greater efficiency than
first-difference GMM. I present empirical results of two-steps system GMM regressions
in the next subsection.
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4.2 Empirical Results
I start from investigating direct effects of oligarch ownership. Table 4 presents the results
of regressions (models 1 and 4). Notice that R-squared is not performed because this
concept is valid only for the models fitting the residual sum of squares. The main target
variable (Oligarch) shows statistically insignificant relation for both debt-to-capital and
liabilities-to-assets ratios. This result suggests that there is no direct relation between
oligarch ownership and target leverage.
However, models 1 and 4 rely on assumption that oligarch firms’ behavior is not
dependent on the share of ownership. Thus, I also test additional model (7) with control
for a share of oligarch voting rights, OwnOligarch. Nevertheless, this variable also turns
out to be statistically insignificant (models 2 and 5 in table 4). This result implies that
voting share is irrelevant. Furthermore, this confirms the suggestion that oligarchs are
able to effectively control enterprises even with a small share of ownership.
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑂𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ + 𝜗𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑂𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ + 𝛽𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (7)
Next, I test indirect effects of oligarch ownership, caused by ownership-specific co-
efficients. In order to check equality of coefficients 𝛽 I introduce interactions between
Oligarch dummy and firm-level controls (8). Almost all interactions are statistically in-
significant (models 3 and 6 in table 4). The one exception is Oligarch×Tangibility in
model 6 (broad leverage LTA). Therefore, main determinants are equally relevant for
oligarch and non-oligarch companies, although oligarch–owned firms are less sensitive to
the size of collateral in the case of broad leverage. Interpretation seems to be twofold: (1)
oligarch–owned firms borrow beyond the creditworthiness due to lower collateral require-
ments (2) match between larger short-term liabilities and larger current assets. Since the
relation is significant for broad leverage only, the latter seems to be the most reasonable
explanation.




𝑖𝑡𝑂𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (8)
As mentioned earlier, oligarch–owned firms are larger, older, more profitable, and have
a lower share of fixed assets. Hence, lower tangibility and larger size partially explain the
differences in debt and liabilities. However, higher profitability has the opposite effect.
More precisely, positive effects of tangibility and size seem to be alleviated by the negative
effect of profitability. Thus, leverage differences remain largely unexplained.
As a further step, I split my dataset into two sub-samples: oligarch–owned firms and
non-oligarch firms (table 5). First, the results prove that capital structure determinants
are almost equally relevant for oligarch and non-oligarch firms. Size is positively related,
whereas tangibility and profitability are negatively related. On the contrary, age and
growth are statistically insignificant.
Secondly, main differences are accumulated in the adjustment speeds rather than
mediating firm-level factors. In other words, the relation between ownership and leverage
is clearly mediated by adjustment parameters Lag.DTC and Lag.LTA. Oligarch-owned
firms demonstrate far less stable ratios (DTC 50.9%, LTA 43.9%) than non-oligarch
companies (DTC 27.0%, LTA 31.4%). The higher are adjustment costs, the lower will
be adjustment speeds. 1.4–1.9 times higher adjustment speeds imply significantly lower
adjustment costs of the oligarch–owned firms. Therefore, oligarchs affect capital structure
indirectly through lower refinancing costs.
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Table 4: Dynamic panel regressions on the main sample
Dependent variable:
Debt-to-capital (DTC) Liabilities-to-assets (LTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag.DTC 0.688*** 0.689*** 0.662***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.099)
Lag.LTA 0.633*** 0.634*** 0.604***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.076)
Oligarch -0.075 -0.106 -0.601 0.018 0.066 -0.070
(0.074) (0.079) (0.477) (0.054) (0.052) (0.465)
OwnOligarch 0.045 -0.086
(0.061) (0.087)
Size 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.013 0.015 0.012
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Tang -0.116** -0.116** -0.103* -0.271*** -0.268*** -0.214***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.073)
Prof -0.309*** -0.308*** -0.334*** -0.597*** -0.593*** -0.593***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.066) (0.047) (0.048) (0.057)
Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.016 0.016 0.010
(0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025)
Age -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.022 -0.022 -0.023











Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340
Obs. used 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Wald test 592.33*** 593.69*** 660.36*** 1715.90*** 1781.60*** 1876.67***
Sargan test 115.28 115.42 120.21* 109.41 111.22 109.76
Breusch-Pagan 395.1*** 395.13*** 402.01*** 353.06*** 353.09*** 357.96***
AR test (1) -4.79*** -4.78*** -4.48*** -5.67*** -5.67*** -5.39***
AR test (2) 0.47 0.50 0.47 1.49 1.46 1.30
Note: this table summarizes the results of two-steps system GMM regressions on the main sample.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; (*), (**) and (***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance
respectively. Selected statistical tests are Wald test, Sargan test, studentized Breusch-Pagan test, and
autocorrelation (AR) tests.
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Table 5: Dynamic panel regressions on the ownership sub-samples
Dependent variable:
Debt-to-capital (DTC) Liabilities-to-assets (LTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All firms Oligarch Non-Oligarch All firms Oligarch Non-Oligarch
Lag.DTC 0.693*** 0.491*** 0.730***
(0.085) (0.179) (0.072)
Lag.LTA 0.629*** 0.561*** 0.686***
(0.069) (0.094) (0.067)
Size 0.047*** 0.046** 0.037** 0.015 0.057** 0.021
(0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.011) (0.027) (0.016)
Tang -0.114** -0.229** -0.095* -0.269*** -0.369*** -0.198***
(0.047) (0.113) (0.054) (0.057) (0.058) (0.064)
Prof -0.306*** -0.271** -0.414*** -0.594*** -0.521*** -0.612***
(0.059) (0.113) (0.071) (0.046) (0.101) (0.058)
Growth 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.015 0.050** 0.014
(0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.017) (0.021) (0.025)
Age -0.006 -0.005 0.013 -0.021 0.015 0.012
(0.019) (0.025) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2,340 595 1,745 2,340 595 1,745
Obs. used 2,036 533 1,503 2,036 533 1,503
Wald test 582.03*** 200.73*** 709.56*** 1782.96*** 869.78*** 2077.88***
Sargan test 117.01 47.22 117.91 106.71 44.22 109.46
Breusch-Pagan 393.8*** 111.82*** 276.78*** 352.21*** 101.59*** 278.84***
AR test (1) -4.84*** -2.35** -4.18*** -5.65*** -3.07*** -5.07***
AR test (2) 0.50 0.17 0.43 1.49 -1.04 1.82*
Note: this table summarizes the results of two-steps system GMM regressions. Robust standard errors
in parentheses; (*), (**) and (***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively. Selected
statistical tests are Wald test, Sargan test, studentized Breusch-Pagan test, and autocorrelation (AR)
tests.
4.3 Robustness Checks
I conduct an extensive robustness analysis, the main points of which are disclosed here (see
regression results in appendix B). I start by checking alternative specifications of the main
model, taking into account relevant ones. First, I compute regressions with additional firm
level-control for industry effects (industry medians MedDTC and MedLTA, respectively).
In both cases, industry medians are statistically insignificant, whereas main results remain
the same. However, industry effects seem to be strongly correlated with the other firm-
level controls.
Secondly, I exclude time effects from regression. In this case, results remain almost
the same as in the main model. On the contrary, exclusion of all firm-level controls leads
to significant effects of oligarch ownership on the broad leverage. More precisely, this
result appears only in the model with omitted size. This illustrates the importance of
firm size, although the overall effect of differences in firm characteristics is fairly small.
Next, I also switch to a traditional static model (two-way fixed effects). In general,
static framework reproduces almost all of the conclusions from the dynamic model. Size
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is positively related, tangibility and profitability are negatively related, and oligarch vari-
ables are statistically insignificant. In contrast, age and growth are positively related and
statistically significant in some of the models. However, in this model effects of tangibil-
ity, size and age are alleviated by the opposite effect of profitability. Hence, in the static
framework differences in the financing of oligarch and non-oligarch firms could not be
explained in a sufficient way.
The main results are also robust to the use of alternative estimators, such as instru-
mental variables regression. In particular, results remain qualitatively the same: in the
main model oligarch dummy is statistically insignificant or marginally significant; in sub-
samples adjustment speeds are higher for oligarch–owned firms. Although the difference
between adjustment speeds is much lower than in GMM regression, it is still significant.
In contrast, Oligarch–Tangibility interaction is statistically insignificant for both nar-
row and broad leverage measures. In addition, Oligarch–Prof interaction appears to be
marginally significant in relation with DTC, but this relation is not supported by the
evidence from ownership sub-samples.
Finally, I check whether outliers could have any effect on the final results. Profitability
and growth are influenced by outliers and thus were winsorized in the previous section.
I compute additional regressions with outliers present (i.e., non-winsorized variables). In
short, results remain qualitatively the same, although affected variables show somewhat
higher coefficients.
In addition, I truncate debt-to-capital dependent variable to account for extreme
values (0 and 1). There are a lot of zero-debt firms (678 observations with DTC = 0),
and thus trimmed variable has somewhat higher statistics (mean 0.270, st.dev. 0.261,
median 0.186). However, regressions with trimmed dependent variable also demonstrate
almost the same results.
5 Concluding Remarks
This study examined the effects of oligarch ownership on capital structure policies under
the emerging market environment (Ukraine). My sample includes 26 out of 35 oligarchic
groups, which can be identified over the period of 2002–2016. Overall coverage is 2,340
firm-year observations from 250 Ukrainian firms.
I found that oligarch–owned firms raise more debt and liabilities than their peers, al-
though there is no direct relation between oligarch ownership and target capital structure.
Furthermore, main determinants are almost equally relevant for oligarch and non-oligarch
owned companies. Differences in firm characteristics (and specifically in firm size) also
explain only a small share of leverage variation.
Whereas the determinants of target leverage are similar, oligarch–owned firms have
significantly higher adjustment speeds, and this result is consistent with several robust-
ness tests. More precisely, oligarch–owned firms may rebalance their capital structures
more frequently due to better access to loans, caused by group affiliations and politi-
cal connections. In sum, influential ownership is positively related to capital structure.
Oligarch–owned firms benefit from their accumulated advantages, while the others might
suffer from credit rationing imposed by oligarch–owned banks. Such distortions could be
the cause of macro-level path dependence in the long-term. Hence, any efforts to suppress
insider lending should be welcomed.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Detailed Dataset Statistics
Table 6: Industry structure of the dataset
Industry ISIC Code Number of firms Number of observationsAll firms Oligarch Non-oligarch All firms Oligarch Non-oligarch
Agriculture A 26 5 23 229 52 177
Mining B 12 5 11 113 63 50
Food C10-12 29 9 21 237 81 156
Apparel C13-15 14 − 14 117 − 117
Wood C16-17,31 10 1 9 108 7 101
Chemical C19-22 13 3 10 121 25 96
ConstrMaterials C22-23 12 1 12 107 9 98
Metallurgy C24-25 13 11 4 151 121 30
Electronic C26-27 13 4 9 131 45 86
Machinery C28-30,33 28 7 21 292 57 235
Utilities D, E 12 7 8 152 69 55
Construction F 23 1 22 216 5 211
Trade G 20 2 18 176 26 150
Transport H 14 1 14 107 15 96
Other I, J, L-T 11 3 10 95 20 87
250 60 206 2,352 595 1,745
Note: this table presents industry structure statistics. Industries are classified according to international standard indus-
trial classification (ISIC, Rev.4) of all economic activities. “Other” category includes other non-specified activities, such as
information and communication, services, professional, scientific and technical, real estate activities. Notice that for 16 firms
(6.4%) controlling owner has changed in 2002-2016.
Table 7: Time structure of the dataset
Year Number of observations (dataset) Number of allAll firms Oligarch Non-oligarch (% olig.-owned) public companies
2002 142 28 114 (19.7) 12,137
2003 180 37 143 (20.6) 11,906
2004 193 42 151 (21.8) 11,730
2005 192 45 147 (23.4) 11,345
2006 188 50 138 (26.6) 10,895
2007 192 48 144 (25.0) 10,406
2008 182 48 134 (26.4) 10,058
2009 160 45 115 (28.1) 9,480
2010 116 32 84 (27.6) 7,962
2011 143 35 108 (24.5) 4,649
2012 155 39 116 (25.2) 3,482
2013 157 46 111 (29.3) 3,637
2014 141 40 101 (28.4) 3,490
2015 128 37 91 (28.9) 3,486
2016 71 23 48 (32.4) 3,122
2,340 595 1,745 (25.4)
Note: this table presents term structure of the dataset (see selection criteria in the text). Number
of public companies (both financial and non-financial, active and shell companies) comes from state
statistical data.
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics of variables
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Panel A: All firms (obs. = 2,340)
Oligarch (dummy) 0.254 0.436 0 0 1
OwnOligarch 0.201 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.997
DTC 0.192 0.252 0.000 0.070 1.000
LTA 0.411 0.272 0.000 0.380 1.000
Size 10.086 2.392 3.935 9.787 16.454
Tang 0.457 0.253 0.000 0.447 1.000
Prof 0.025 0.263 −10.620 0.019 1.507
Prof (regr. input) 0.030 0.134 −0.851 0.019 0.862
Growth 0.087 0.913 −1.042 −0.002 25.140
Growth (regr. input) 0.047 0.293 −0.556 −0.002 1.748
Age 12.525 4.866 0 12 25
MedDTC 0.080 0.064 0.000 0.068 0.356
MedLTA 0.307 0.135 0.095 0.254 0.790
Panel B: Oligarch-owned firms (obs. = 595)
OwnOligarch 0.775 0.214 0.137 0.838 0.997
DTC 0.218 0.261 0.000 0.107 0.961
LTA 0.456 0.256 0.000 0.458 0.993
Size 11.940 1.978 4.781 12.021 16.161
Tang 0.412 0.238 0.000 0.395 1.000
Prof 0.055 0.140 −0.484 0.038 1.507
Prof (regr. input) 0.054 0.131 −0.484 0.038 0.862
Growth 0.129 0.979 −0.749 −0.001 19.200
Growth (regr. input) 0.074 0.333 −0.556 −0.001 1.748
Age 12.812 4.716 0 13 23
MedDTC 0.083 0.057 0.004 0.079 0.356
MedLTA 0.349 0.160 0.095 0.282 0.790
Panel C: Non-oligarch owners (obs. = 1,745)
OwnOligarch 0.005 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.485
DTC 0.183 0.249 0.000 0.060 1.000
LTA 0.396 0.275 0.000 0.347 1.000
Size 9.453 2.183 3.935 9.073 16.454
Tang 0.472 0.256 0.000 0.474 0.987
Prof 0.015 0.292 −10.620 0.014 0.877
Prof (regr. input) 0.022 0.135 −0.851 0.014 0.862
Growth 0.072 0.889 −1.042 −0.002 25.140
Growth (regr. input) 0.038 0.277 −0.556 −0.002 1.748
Age 12.428 4.914 0 12 25
MedDTC 0.079 0.066 0.000 0.068 0.328
MedLTA 0.292 0.123 0.095 0.248 0.703
Note: this table presents descriptive statistics of debt-to-capital (DTC ), liabilities-to-assets
ratio (LTA), and explanatory variables. See table 2 for variables’ definitions. In order to
alleviate the influence of outliers, Prof and Growth were winsorized before regression analysis.
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Appendix B. Robustness Checks
This appendix discloses the following robustness checks (see text for the further details):
Table 9: alternative specifications;
Tables 10 and 11: traditional static model;
Tables 12 and 13: instrumental variables regression;
Tables 14 and 15: regressions with outliers (non-winsorized independent variables);
Tables 16: Regressions using the trimmed dependent variable DTC (debt-to-capital).
Table 9: Alternative specifications (main sample)
Dependent variable:
Debt-to-capital (DTC) Liabilities-to-assets (LTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lag.DTC 0.676*** 0.686*** 0.827*** 0.706***
(0.097) (0.073) (0.057) (0.074)
Lag.LTA 0.594*** 0.669*** 0.979*** 0.724***
(0.086) (0.061) (0.032) (0.068)
Oligarch -0.088 -0.050 0.075 -0.021 0.044 -0.022 0.084** 0.020
(0.077) (0.064) (0.054) (0.059) (0.048) (0.056) (0.034) (0.034)
Size 0.058*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.024 0.030*** 0.021***
(0.019) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
Tang -0.116*** -0.159*** -0.255*** -0.287***
(0.043) (0.045) (0.059) (0.058)
Prof -0.309*** -0.306*** -0.589*** -0.561***
(0.057) (0.062) (0.047) (0.047)
Growth -0.004 -0.007 0.016 0.015
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Age -0.009 0.002 -0.040 0.004**





Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes No No No Yes No No No
Obs. used 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Wald test 592.47*** 467.01*** 263.27*** 431.14*** 962.20*** 1461.57*** 1100.11*** 1242.79***
Sargan test 105.89 113.71 111.3 117.37 105.41 115.67 119.61 118.93
Note: this table summarizes the results of two-steps system GMM regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses; (*),
(**) and (***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 10: Static model (main sample)
Dependent variable:
Debt-to-capital (DTC) Liabilities-to-assets (LTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oligarch 0.040 0.114 -0.147 0.038 0.101 -0.103
(0.058) (0.079) (0.327) (0.061) (0.094) (0.334)
OwnOligarch -0.109 -0.094
(0.079) (0.106)
Size 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.021 0.021 0.019
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Tang -0.108** -0.108** -0.097* -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.274***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.071)
Prof -0.289*** -0.293*** -0.296*** -0.466*** -0.469*** -0.469***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.061) (0.048) (0.048) (0.060)
Growth -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.036**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Age 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011***











Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. used 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340
R2 0.116 0.118 0.118 0.205 0.206 0.207
Adj. R2 0.109 0.110 0.109 0.198 0.199 0.199
F-test 6.18*** 6.04*** 5.77*** 11.93*** 11.59*** 10.76***
Note: this table summarizes the results of fixed effects panel regressions. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; (*), (**) and (***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
Table 11: Static model (ownership sub-samples)
Dependent variable:
Debt-to-capital (DTC) Liabilities-to-assets (LTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All firms Oligarch Non-Oligarch All firms Oligarch Non-Oligarch
Size 0.051*** 0.091*** 0.044** 0.021 0.052** 0.016
(0.014) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.027)
Tang -0.107** -0.128* -0.116** -0.273*** -0.243*** -0.294***
(0.045) (0.069) (0.055) (0.058) (0.089) (0.071)
Prof -0.284*** -0.224*** -0.301*** -0.461*** -0.438*** -0.471***
(0.049) (0.069) (0.061) (0.048) (0.070) (0.059)
Growth -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 0.043*** 0.048** 0.037**
(0.013) (0.023) (0.016) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017)
Age 0.006** 0.008* 0.004 0.011*** 0.012** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. used 2,340 595 1,745 2,340 595 1,745
R2 0.115 0.170 0.121 0.204 0.228 0.217
Adj. R2 0.108 0.144 0.111 0.198 0.204 0.209
F-test 6.42*** 4.21*** 5.26*** 12.37*** 7.47*** 10.30***
Note: this table summarizes the results of fixed effects panel regressions. Robust standard errors
in parentheses; (*), (**) and (***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 12: Instrumental variables regressions (main sample)
Dependent variable:
Debt-to-capital (DTC) Liabilities-to-assets (LTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag.DTC 0.604*** 0.605*** 0.602***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Lag.LTA 0.697*** 0.696*** 0.697***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Oligarch 0.063* 0.021 -0.229 0.045* 0.090 -0.065
(0.039) (0.054) (0.225) (0.026) (0.069) (0.270)
OwnOligarch 0.058 -0.062
(0.075) (0.088)
Size 0.027** 0.027** 0.021* 0.023* 0.023* 0.021
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Tang -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.099** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.172***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.041) (0.033) (0.033) (0.041)
Prof -0.324*** -0.323*** -0.368*** -0.535*** -0.536*** -0.560***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.069) (0.034) (0.034) (0.086)
Growth 0.008 0.008 -0.003 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.058***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005**











Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. used 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743
Wald test 769.13*** 774.01*** 843.20*** 1713.30*** 1707.63*** 1795.90***
Note: this table summarizes the results of instrumental variables regressions. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; (*), (**) and (***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
Table 13: Instrumental variables regressions (ownership sub-samples)
Dependent variable:
Debt-to-capital (DTC) Liabilities-to-assets (LTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All firms Oligarch Non-Oligarch All firms Oligarch Non-Oligarch
Lag.DTC 0.606*** 0.540*** 0.623***
(0.051) (0.086) (0.062)
Lag.LTA 0.698*** 0.653*** 0.707***
(0.031) (0.055) (0.038)
Size 0.027** 0.064*** 0.016 0.024* 0.045* 0.016
(0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015)
Tang -0.125*** -0.187*** -0.101** -0.188*** -0.201*** -0.181***
(0.033) (0.058) (0.040) (0.033) (0.049) (0.043)
Prof -0.318*** -0.265*** -0.361*** -0.531*** -0.464*** -0.573***
(0.046) (0.076) (0.056) (0.034) (0.059) (0.039)
Growth 0.009 0.033 -0.002 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.056***
(0.016) (0.027) (0.018) (0.015) (0.025) (0.019)
Age 0.001 0.006* -0.001 0.005*** 0.006** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. used 1,743 470 1,273 1,743 470 1,273
Wald test 774.42*** 405.18*** 633.36*** 1747.32*** 724.72*** 1425.46***
Note: this table summarizes the results of instrumental variables regressions. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; (*), (**) and (***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 14: Regressions with outliers (main sample)
Dependent variable:
Debt-to-capital (DTC) Liabilities-to-assets (LTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag.DTC 0.694*** 0.695*** 0.672***
(0.087) (0.088) (0.103)
Lag.LTA 0.646*** 0.648*** 0.613***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.076)
Oligarch -0.071 -0.087 -0.502 0.019 0.069 0.108
(0.078) (0.082) (0.488) (0.051) (0.054) (0.434)
OwnOligarch 0.026 -0.082
(0.061) (0.086)
Size 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.017 0.019 0.018
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Tang -0.106** -0.106** -0.096* -0.252*** -0.249*** -0.188**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.056) (0.066) (0.066) (0.081)
Prof -0.230*** -0.230*** -0.268*** -0.407*** -0.402*** -0.412***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.089)
Growth -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.013 -0.012 -0.015











Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. used 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036 2,036
Wald test 555.99*** 552.27*** 593.00*** 1761.09*** 1856.04*** 1846.65***
Sargan test 112.47 112.31 117.56 105.17 106.40 104.92
Note: this table summarizes the results of two-steps system GMM regressions with outliers (non-
winsorized variables Growth and Prof). Robust standard errors in parentheses; (*), (**) and (***)
denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
Table 15: Regressions with outliers (ownership sub-samples)
Dependent variable:
Debt-to-capital (DTC) Liabilities-to-assets (LTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All firms Oligarch Non-Oligarch All firms Oligarch Non-Oligarch
Lag.DTC 0.698*** 0.518*** 0.730***
(0.086) (0.185) (0.072)
Lag.LTA 0.644*** 0.596*** 0.693***
(0.070) (0.192) (0.067)
Size 0.047*** 0.050** 0.040** 0.020* 0.048* 0.023
(0.015) (0.024) (0.016) (0.011) (0.026) (0.015)
Tang -0.105** -0.209* -0.069 -0.251*** -0.356*** -0.167**
(0.048) (0.107) (0.052) (0.063) (0.130) (0.068)
Prof -0.230*** -0.162 -0.288*** -0.407*** -0.369*** -0.419***
(0.058) (0.162) (0.072) (0.072) (0.103) (0.100)
Growth -0.001 -0.010** -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006)
Age -0.003 0.000 0.015 -0.011 0.006 0.013
(0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020)
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. used 2,036 533 1,503 2,036 533 1,503
Wald test 541.58*** 250.18*** 624.39*** 1817.82*** 839.50*** 1754.67***
Sargan test 113.46 50.39 102.37 103.14 45.05 110.58
Note: this table summarizes the results of two-steps system GMM regressions with outliers (non-
winsorized variables Growth and Prof). Robust standard errors in parentheses; (*), (**) and (***)
denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
22
Table 16: Regressions using the trimmed dependent variable
Dependent variable: trimmed debt-to-capital (DTC)
Main sample (all firms) Oligarch Non-Oligarch
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag.DTC (trimmed) 0.645*** 0.644*** 0.627*** 0.646*** 0.493*** 0.611***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.071) (0.078) (0.150) (0.084)




Size 0.047* 0.048* 0.050* 0.049* 0.077* 0.043*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) (0.023)
Tang -0.154** -0.156** -0.117 -0.155** -0.181* -0.117
(0.068) (0.069) (0.094) (0.067) (0.108) (0.080)
Prof -0.380*** -0.381*** -0.408** -0.380*** -0.423*** -0.365***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.167) (0.126) (0.137) (0.140)
Growth -0.010 -0.010 -0.017 -0.009 -0.008 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.010) (0.024)
Age -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.010 -0.003











Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. used 1,340 1,340 1,340 1,340 396 944
Wald test 586.39*** 582.50*** 647.84*** 561.18*** 274.35*** 587.27***
Sargan test 88.32 88.37 86.17 87.94 36.26 83.13
Note: this table summarizes the results of two-steps system GMM regressions using the trimmed depen-
dent variable DTC. Robust standard errors in parentheses; (*), (**) and (***) denote 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels of significance respectively.
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